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Abstract
In this paper, we propose generating artificial data that retain
statistical properties of real data as the means of providing
privacy for the original dataset. We use generative adversarial
networks to draw privacy-preserving artificial data samples
and derive an empirical method to assess the risk of infor-
mation disclosure in a differential-privacy-like way. Our ex-
periments show that we are able to generate labelled data of
high quality and use it to successfully train and validate su-
pervised models. Finally, we demonstrate that our approach
significantly reduces vulnerability of such models to model
inversion attacks.
1 Introduction
Following recent advancements in deep learning, more and
more people and companies get interested in putting their
data in use and employ machine learning (ML) to generate
a wide range of benefits that span financial, social, medi-
cal, security, and other aspects. At the same time, however,
such models are able to capture a fine level of detail in
training data, potentially compromising privacy of individ-
uals whose features sharply differ from others. Recent re-
search (Fredrikson, Jha, and Ristenpart 2015) suggests that
even without access to internal model parameters it is possi-
ble to recover (up to a certain degree) individual examples,
e.g. faces, from the training set.
The latter result is especially disturbing knowing that deep
learning models are becoming an integral part of our lives,
making its way to phones, smart watches, cars, and appli-
ances. And since these models are often trained on cus-
tomers’ data, such training set recovery techniques endanger
privacy even without access to the manufacturer’s servers
where these models are being trained.
One direction to tackle this problem is enforcing privacy
during training (Abadi et al. 2016; Papernot et al. 2016;
2018). We will refer to these techniques as model release
methods. While these approaches perform well in ML tasks
and provide strong privacy guarantees, they are often restric-
tive. First and foremost, releasing a single trained model
does not provide much flexibility in the future. For in-
stance, it would significantly reduce possibilities for com-
bining models trained on data from different sources. Eval-
uating a variety of such models and picking the best one is
also complicated by the need of adjusting private training for
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Figure 1: Architecture of our solution. Sensitive data is used
to train a GAN to produce a private artificial dataset, which
then can be used by any ML model.
each of them. Moreover, most of these methods assume (im-
plicitly or explicitly) access to public data of similar nature,
which may not be possible in areas like medicine.
In contrast, we study the task of privacy-preserving data
release, which has many immediate advantages. First, any
ML model could be trained on released data without ad-
ditional assumptions. Second, data from different sources
could be easily pooled to build stronger models. Third,
released data could be traded on data markets1, where
anonymisation and protection of sensitive information is one
of the biggest obstacles. Finally, data publishing would fa-
cilitate transparency and reproducibility of research studies.
In particular, we are interested in solving two problems.
First, how to preserve high utility of data for ML algorithms
while protecting sensitive information in the dataset. Sec-
ond, how to quantify the risk of recovering private informa-
tion from the published dataset, and thus, the trained model.
The main idea of our approach is to use generative adver-
sarial networks (GANs) (Goodfellow et al. 2014) to create
artificial datasets to be used in place of real data for train-
ing. This method has a number of advantages over the ear-
lier work (Abadi et al. 2016; Papernot et al. 2016; 2018;
Bindschaedler, Shokri, and Gunter 2017). First of all, our so-
lution allows releasing entire datasets, thereby possessing all
the benefits of private data release as opposed to model re-
lease. Second, it achieves high accuracy without pre-training
1https://www.datamakespossible.com/
value-of-data-2018/dawn-of-data-marketplace
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on similar public data. Third, it is more intuitive and flexible,
e.g. it does not require a complex distributed architecture.
To estimate potential privacy risks, we design an ex post
analysis framework for generated data. We use KL diver-
gence estimation and Chebyshev’s inequality to find statisti-
cal bounds on expected privacy loss for a dataset in question.
Our contributions in this paper are the following:
• we propose a novel, yet simple, approach for private data
release, and to the best of our knowledge, this is the first
practical solution for complex real-world data;
• we introduce a new framework for statistical estimation
of potential privacy loss of the released data;
• we show that our method achieves learning performance
of model release methods and is resilient to model inver-
sion attacks.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2,
we give an overview of related work. Section 3 contains
some preliminaries. In Section 4, we describe our approach
and privacy estimation framework, and discuss its limita-
tions. Experimental results and implementation details are
presented in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Related Work
In recent years, as machine learning applications become a
commonplace, a body of work on security of these methods
grows at a rapid pace. Several important vulnerabilities and
corresponding attacks on ML models have been discovered,
raising the need of devising suitable defences. Among the
attacks that compromise privacy of training data, model in-
version (Fredrikson, Jha, and Ristenpart 2015) and member-
ship inference (Shokri et al. 2017) received high attention.
Model inversion (Fredrikson, Jha, and Ristenpart 2015)
is based on observing the output probabilities of the target
model for a given class and performing gradient descent on
an input reconstruction. Membership inference (Shokri et al.
2017) assumes an attacker with access to similar data, which
is used to train a ”shadow” model, mimicking the target, and
an attack model. The latter predicts if a certain example has
already been seen during training based on its output proba-
bilities. Note that both attacks can be performed in a black-
box setting, without access to the model internal parameters.
To protect privacy while still benefiting from the use of
statistics and ML, many techniques have been developed
over the years, including k-anonymity (Sweeney 2002), l-
diversity (Machanavajjhala et al. 2007), t-closeness (Li,
Li, and Venkatasubramanian 2007), and differential privacy
(DP) (Dwork 2006). The latter has been recognised as a rig-
orous standard and is widely accepted by the research com-
munity. Its generic formulation, however, makes it hard to
achieve and to quantify potential privacy loss of the already
trained model. To overcome this, we build upon notions of
empirical DP (Abowd, Schneider, and Vilhuber 2013) and
on-average KL privacy (Wang, Lei, and Fienberg 2016).
Most of the ML-specific literature in the area concentrates
on the task of privacy-preserving model release. One take on
the problem is to distribute training and use disjoint datasets.
For example, Shokri and Shmatikov (2015) propose to train
a model in a distributed manner by communicating sani-
tised updates from participants to a central authority. Such
a method, however, yields high privacy losses (Abadi et al.
2016; Papernot et al. 2016). An alternative technique sug-
gested by Papernot et al. (2016), also uses disjoint training
sets and builds an ensemble of independently trained teacher
models to transfer knowledge to a student model by labelling
public data. This result has been extended in (Papernot et al.
2018) to achieve state-of-the-art image classification results
in a private setting (with single-digit DP bounds). A differ-
ent approach is taken by Abadi et al. (2016). They suggest
using differentially private stochastic gradient descent (DP-
SGD) to train deep learning models in a private manner. This
approach achieves high accuracy while maintaining low DP
bounds, but may also require pre-training on public data.
A more recent line of research focuses on private data
release and providing privacy via generating synthetic
data (Bindschaedler, Shokri, and Gunter 2017; Huang et al.
2017; Beaulieu-Jones et al. 2017). In this scenario, DP is
hard to guarantee, and thus, such models either relax the
DP requirements or remain limited to simple data. In (Bind-
schaedler, Shokri, and Gunter 2017), authors use a graph-
ical probabilistic model to learn an underlying data distri-
bution and transform real data points (seeds) into synthetic
data points, which are then filtered by a privacy test based
on a plausible deniability criterion. This procedure would be
rather expensive for complex data, such as images. Huang et
al. (2017) introduce the notion of generative adversarial pri-
vacy and use GANs to obfuscate real data points w.r.t. pre-
defined private attributes, enabling privacy for more realistic
datasets. Finally, a natural approach to try is training GANs
using DP-SGD (Beaulieu-Jones et al. 2017; Xie et al. 2018;
Zhang, Ji, and Wang 2018). However, it proved extremely
difficult to stabilise training with the necessary amount of
noise, which scales as
√
m w.r.t. the number of model pa-
rameters m. It makes these methods inapplicable to more
complex datasets without resorting to unrealistic (at least for
some areas) assumptions, like access to public data from the
same distribution.
Similarly, our approach uses GANs, but data is generated
without real seeds or applying noise to gradients. Instead, we
verify experimentally that out-of-the-box GAN samples can
be sufficiently different from real data, and expected privacy
loss is empirically bounded by single-digit numbers.
3 Preliminaries
This section provides necessary definitions and background.
Let us commence with approximate differential privacy.
Definition 1. A randomised function (mechanism) M :
D → R with domain D and range R satisfies (ε, δ)-
differential privacy if for any two adjacent inputs d, d′ ∈ D
and for any outcome o ∈ R the following holds:
Pr [M(d) = o] ≤ eε Pr [M(d′) = o] + δ. (1)
Definition 2. Privacy loss of a randomised mechanismM :
D → R for inputs d, d′ ∈ D and outcome o ∈ R takes the
following form:
L(M(d)‖M(d′)) = log
Pr [M(d) = o]
Pr [M(d′) = o] . (2)
Definition 3. The Gaussian noise mechanism achieving
(ε, δ)-DP, for a function f : D → Rm, is defined as
M(d) = f(d) +N (0, σ2), (3)
where σ > C
√
2 log 1.25δ /ε and C is the L2-sensitivity of f .
For more details on differential privacy and the Gaussian
mechanism, we refer the reader to (Dwork and Roth 2014).
In our privacy estimation framework, we also use some
classical notions from probability and information theory.
Definition 4. The KullbackLeibler (KL) divergence between
two continuous probability distributions P and Q with cor-
responding densities p, q is given by:
DKL(P‖Q) =
∫ +∞
−∞
p(x) log
p(x)
q(x)
dx. (4)
Note that KL divergence between the distributions of
M(d) andM(d′) is nothing but the expectation of the pri-
vacy loss random variable E[L(M(d)‖M(d′))].
Finally, Chebyshev’s inequality is used to obtain tail
bounds. In particular, as we expect the distribution to be
asymmetric, we use the version with semi-variances (Berck
and Hihn 1982) to get a sharper bound:
Pr(x ≥ E[x] + kσ) ≤ 1
k2
σ2+
σ2
, (5)
where σ2+ =
∫ +∞
E[x] p(x)(x − E[x])2dx is the upper semi-
variance.
4 Our Approach
In this section, we describe our solution, its further improve-
ments, and provide details of the privacy estimation frame-
work. We then discuss limitations of the method. More back-
ground on privacy can be found in (Dwork and Roth 2014).
The main idea of our approach is to use artificial data for
learning and publishing instead of real (see Figure 1 for a
general workflow). The intuition behind it is the following.
Since it is possible to recover training examples from ML
models (Fredrikson, Jha, and Ristenpart 2015), we need to
limit the exposure of real data during training. While this can
be achieved by DP training (e.g. DP-SGD), it would have the
limitations mentioned earlier. Moreover, certain attacks can
still be successful if DP bounds are loose (Hitaj, Ateniese,
and Pe´rez-Cruz 2017). Removing real data from the train-
ing process altogether would add another layer of protection
and limit the information leakage to artificial samples. What
remains to show is that artificial data is sufficiently different
from real.
4.1 Differentially Private Critic
Despite the fact that the generator does not have access
to real data in the training process, one cannot guarantee
that generated samples will not repeat the input. To alle-
viate this problem, we propose to enforce differential pri-
vacy on the output of the discriminator (critic). This is done
by employing the Gaussian noise mechanism (Dwork and
Roth 2014) at the second-to-last layer: clipping the L2 norm
of the input and adding Gaussian noise. To be more spe-
cific, activations a(x) of the second-to-last layer become
a˜(x) = a(x)/max(‖a(x)‖2, 1)+N (0;σ2). We refer to this
version of the critic as DP critic.
Note that if the chosen GAN loss function was directly
differentiable w.r.t. generator output, i.e. if critic could be
treated as a black box, this modification would enforce the
same DP guarantees on generator parameters, and conse-
quently, all generated samples. Unfortunately, this is not the
case for practically all existing versions of GANs, including
WGAN-GP (Gulrajani et al. 2017) used in our experiments.
As our evaluation shows, this modification has a number
of advantages. First, it improves diversity of samples and de-
creases similarity with real data. Second, it allows to prolong
training, and hence, obtain higher quality samples. Finally,
in our experiments, it significantly improves the ability of
GANs to generate samples conditionally.
4.2 Privacy Estimation Framework
Our framework builds upon ideas of empirical DP
(EDP) (Abowd, Schneider, and Vilhuber 2013; Schneider
and Abowd 2015) and on-average KL privacy (Wang, Lei,
and Fienberg 2016). The first can be viewed as a measure of
sensitivity on posterior distributions of outcomes (Charest
and Hou 2017) (in our case, generated data distributions),
while the second relaxes DP notion to the case of an average
user.
As we don’t have access to exact posterior distributions, a
straightforward EDP procedure in our scenario would be the
following: (1) train GAN on the original dataset D; (2) re-
move a random sample from D; (3) re-train GAN on the up-
dated set; (4) estimate probabilities of all outcomes and the
maximum privacy loss value; (5) repeat (1)–(4) sufficiently
many times to approximate ε, δ.
If the generative model is simple, this procedure can
be used without modification. Otherwise, for models like
GANs, it becomes prohibitively expensive due to repetitive
re-training (steps (1)–(3)). Another obstacle is estimating the
maximum privacy loss value (step (4)). To overcome these
two issues, we propose the following.
First, to avoid re-training, we imitate the removal of ex-
amples directly on the generated set D˜. We define a similar-
ity metric sim(x, y) between two data points x and y that
reflects important characteristics of data (see Section 5 for
details). For every randomly selected real example i, we re-
move k nearest artificial neighbours to simulate absence of
this example in the training set and obtain D˜−i. Our intu-
ition behind this operation is the following. Removing a real
example would result in a lower probability density in the
corresponding region of space. If this change is picked up
by a GAN, which we assume is properly trained (e.g. there
is no mode collapse), the density of this region in the gen-
erated examples space should also decrease. The number of
neighbours k is a hyper-parameter. In our experiments, it is
chosen heuristically by computing KL divergence between
the real and artificial data distributions and assuming that all
the difference comes from one point.
Second, we propose to relax the worst-case privacy loss
bound in step (4) by the expected-case bound, in the same
manner as on-average KL privacy. This relaxation allows us
to use a high-dimensional KL divergence estimator (Pe´rez-
Cruz 2008) to obtain the expected privacy loss for every pair
of adjacent datasets (D˜ and D˜−i). There are two major ad-
vantages of this estimator: it converges almost surely to the
true value of KL divergence; and it does not require inter-
mediate density estimates to converge to the true probabil-
ity measures. Also since this estimator uses nearest neigh-
bours to approximate KL divergence, our heuristic described
above is naturally linked to the estimation method.
Finally, after obtaining sufficiently many samples of dif-
ferent pairs (D˜, D˜−i), we use Chebyshev’s inequality to
bound the probability γ = Pr(E[L(M(D)‖M(D′))] ≥ µ) of
the expected privacy loss (Dwork and Rothblum 2016) ex-
ceeding a predefined threshold µ. To deal with the problem
of insufficiently many samples, one could use a sample ver-
sion of inequality (Saw, Yang, and Mo 1984) at the cost of
looser bounds.
4.3 Limitations
Our empirical privacy estimator could be improved in a
number of ways. For instance, providing worst-case privacy
loss bounds would be largely beneficial. Furthermore, sim-
ulating the removal of training examples currently depends
on heuristics and the chosen similarity metric, which may
not lead to representative samples and therefore, poor guar-
antees.
We provide bounds on expected privacy loss based on ex
post analysis of the artificial dataset, which is not equiv-
alent to the traditional formulation of DP and has certain
limitations (Charest and Hou 2017) (e.g. it only concerns
a given dataset). Nevertheless, it may be useful in the sit-
uations where strict privacy guarantees are not required or
cannot be achieved by existing methods, or when one wants
to get a better idea about expected privacy loss rather than
the highly unlikely worst-case.
Lastly, all existing limitations of GANs (or generative
models in general), such as training instability or mode col-
lapse, will apply to this method. Hence, at the current state
of the field, our approach may be difficult to adapt to inputs
other than image data. Yet, there is still a number of privacy-
sensitive applications, e.g. medical imaging or facial analy-
sis, that could benefit from our technique. And as generative
methods progress, new uses will be possible.
5 Evaluation
In this section, we describe the experimental setup and im-
plementation, and evaluate our method on MNIST (LeCun
et al. 1998), SVHN (Netzer et al. 2011), and CelebA (Liu et
al. 2015) datasets.
Table 1: Accuracy of student models for non-private base-
line, PATE (Papernot et al. 2016), and our method.
Dataset Non-private PATE Our approach
MNIST 99.2% 98.0% 98.3%
SVHN 92.8% 82.7% 87.7%
Table 2: Empirical privacy parameters: expected privacy loss
bound µ and probability γ of exceeding it.
Dataset Method µ γ
MNIST WGAN-GP 5.80WGAN-GP (DP critic) 5.36
SVHN WGAN-GP 13.16 10−5WGAN-GP (DP critic) 4.92
CelebA WGAN-GP 6.27WGAN-GP (DP critic) 4.15
5.1 Experimental Setting
We evaluate our method in two major ways. First, we show
that not only is it feasible to train ML models purely on gen-
erated data, but it is also possible to achieve high learning
performance (Section 5.3). Second, we compute empirical
bounds on expected privacy loss and evaluate the effective-
ness of artificial data against model inversion attacks (Sec-
tion 5.4).
Learning performance experiments are set up as follows:
1. Train a generative model (teacher) on the original dataset
using only the training split.
2. Generate an artificial dataset by the obtained model and
use it to train ML models (students).
3. Evaluate students on a held-out test set.
Note that there is no dependency between teacher and stu-
dent models. Moreover, student models are not constrained
to neural networks and can be implemented as any type of
machine learning algorithm.
We choose three commonly used image datasets for our
experiments: MNIST, SVHN, and CelebA. MNIST is a
handwritten digit recognition dataset consisting of 60000
training examples and 10000 test examples, each example
is a 28x28 size greyscale image. SVHN is also a digit recog-
nition task, with 73257 images for training and 26032 for
testing. The examples are coloured 32x32 pixel images of
house numbers from Google Street View. CelebA is a fa-
cial attributes dataset with 202599 images, each of which
we crop to 128x128 and then downscale to 48x48.
5.2 Implementation Details
For our experiments, we use Python and Pytorch frame-
work.2 We implement, with some minor modifications, a
Wasserstein GAN with gradient penalty (WGAN-GP) by
Gulrajani et al. (2017). More specifically, the critic consists
2http://pytorch.org
Figure 2: Results of the model inversion attack. Top to bot-
tom: real target images, reconstructions from non-private
model, our method, and DP model.
Table 3: Face detection and recognition rates (pairs with dis-
tances below 0.99) for non-private, our method, and DP.
Non-private Our approach DP
Detection 63.6% 1.3% 0.0%
Recognition 11.0% 0.3% −
of four convolutional layers with SELU (Klambauer et al.
2017) activations (instead of ReLU) followed by a fully con-
nected linear layer which outputs a d-dimensional feature
vector (d = 64). For the DP critic, we implement the Gaus-
sian noise mechanism (Dwork and Roth 2014) by clipping
the L2-norm of this feature vector to C = 1 and adding
Gaussian noise with σ = 1.5 (we refer to it as DP layer).
Finally, it is passed through a linear classification layer. The
generator starts with a fully connected linear layer that trans-
forms noise and labels into a 4096-dimensional feature vec-
tor which is then passed through a SELU activation and three
deconvolution layers with SELU activations. The output of
the third deconvolution layer is downsampled by max pool-
ing and normalised with a tanh activation function.
Similarly to the original paper, we use a classical WGAN
value function with the gradient penalty that enforces Lips-
chitz constraint on a critic. We also set the penalty parameter
λ = 10 and the number of critic iterations ncritic = 5. Fur-
thermore, we modify the architecture to allow for condition-
ing WGAN on class labels. Binarised labels are appended to
the input of the generator and to the linear layer of the critic
after convolutions. Therefore, the generator can be used to
create labelled datasets for supervised learning.
Both networks are trained using Adam (Kingma and Ba
2015) with learning rate 10−4, β1 = 0, β2 = 0.9, and a
batch size of 64.
The student network is constructed of two convolu-
tional layers with ReLU activations, batch normalisation and
max pooling, followed by two fully connected layers with
ReLU, and a softmax output layer. Note that this network
does not achieve state-of-the-art performance on the used
datasets, but we are primarily interested in evaluating the
relative performance drop compared to a non-private model.
To estimate privacy loss, we carry out the procedure
Figure 3: Privacy-accuracy trade-off curve and correspond-
ing image reconstructions from a multi-layer perceptron
trained on artificial MNIST dataset.
presented in Section 4. Specifically, based on recent ideas
in image qualitative evaluation, e.g. FID and Inception
Score, we compute image features by the Inception V3 net-
work (Szegedy et al. 2016) and use inverse distances be-
tween features as sim function. We implement the KL diver-
gence estimator (Pe´rez-Cruz 2008) and use k-d trees (Bent-
ley 1975) for fast nearest neighbour searches. For privacy
evaluation, we implement the model inversion attack.
5.3 Learning Performance
First, we evaluate the generalisation ability of a student
model trained on artificial data. More specifically, we train
a student model on generated data and report test classifica-
tion accuracy on a held-out real set.
As noted above, most of the work on privacy-preserving
ML focuses on model release methods and assumes (explic-
itly or implicitly) access to similar ”public” data in one form
or another (Abadi et al. 2016; Papernot et al. 2016; 2018;
Zhang, Ji, and Wang 2018). On the other hand, existing data
release solutions struggle with high-dimensional data (Zhu
et al. 2017). It limits the choice of methods for comparison.
We chose to compare learning performance with the cur-
rent state-of-the-art model release technique, PATE by Pa-
pernot et al. (2018), which uses a relatively small set of un-
labelled ”public” data. Since our approach does not require
any ”public” data, in order to make the evaluation more ap-
propriate, we pick the results of PATE corresponding to the
least number of labelling queries.
Table 1 shows test accuracy for the non-private base-
line model (trained on the real training set), PATE, and our
method. We observe that artificial data allows us to achieve
98.3% accuracy on MNIST and 87.7% accuracy on SVHN,
which is comparable or better than corresponding results of
PATE. These results demonstrate that our approach does not
compromise learning performance, and may even improve
it, while enabling the full flexibility of data release methods.
Additionally, we train a simple logistic regression model
on artificial MNIST samples, and obtain 91.69% accuracy,
(a) Generated (b) Real
Figure 4: Generated and closest real examples for SVHN.
compared to 92.58% on the original data, confirming that
student models are not restricted to a specific type.
Furthermore, we observe that one could use artificial data
for validation and hyper-parameter tuning. In our experi-
ments, correlation coefficients between real and artificial
validation losses range from 0.7197 to 0.9972 for MNIST
and from 0.8047 to 0.9810 for SVHN.
5.4 Privacy Analysis
Using the privacy estimation framework (see Section 4), we
fix the probability γ of exceeding the expected privacy loss
bound µ in all experiments to 10−5 and compute the corre-
sponding µ for each dataset and two versions of WGAN-GP
(vanilla and with DP critic). Table 2 summarises our find-
ings. It is worth noting, that our µ should not be viewed as
an empirical estimation of ε of DP, since the former bounds
expected privacy loss while the latter–maximum. These two
quantities, however, in our experiments turn out to be similar
to deep learning DP bounds found in recent literature (Abadi
et al. 2016; Papernot et al. 2018). This may be explained by
tight concentration of privacy loss random variable (Dwork
and Rothblum 2016) or loose estimation. Additionally, DP
critic helps to bring down µ values in all cases.
The lack of theoretical privacy guarantees for our method
neccesitates assessing the strength of provided protection.
We perform this evaluation by running the model inversion
attack (Fredrikson, Jha, and Ristenpart 2015) on a student
model. Note that we also experimented with another well-
known attack on machine learning models, the membership
inference (Shokri et al. 2017). However, we did not include
it in the final evaluation, because of the poor attacker’s per-
formance in our setting (nearly random guess accuracy for
given datasets and models even without any protection).
In order to run the attack, we train a student model (a sim-
ple multi-layer perceptron with two hidden layers of 1000
and 300 neurons) in three settings: real data, artificial data
generated by GAN (with DP critic), and real data with differ-
ential privacy (using DP-SGD with a small ε < 1). As facial
recognition is a more privacy-sensitive application, and pro-
vides a better visualisation of the attack, we picked CelebA
attribute prediction task to run this experiment.
Figure 2 shows the results of the model inversion attack.
The top row presents the real target images. The following
(a) Generated (b) Real
Figure 5: Generated and closest real examples for CelebA.
rows depict reconstructed images from a non-private model,
a model trained on GAN samples, and DP model, corre-
spondingly. One can observe a clear information loss in re-
constructed images going from non-private model, to arti-
ficial data, to DP. The latter is superior in decoupling the
model and the training data, and is a preferred choice in
the model release setting and/or if public data is accessible
for pre-training. The non-private model, albeit trained with
abundant data (∼200K images) reveals facial features, such
as skin and hair colour, expression, etc. Our method, de-
spite failing to conceal general shapes in training images (i.e.
faces), seems to achieve a trade-off, hiding most of the spe-
cific features. The obtained reconstructions are either very
noisy (columns 1, 2, 6, 8), much like DP, or converge to
some average feature-less faces (columns 4, 5, 7).
We also analyse real and reconstructed image pairs using
OpenFace (Amos et al. 2016) (see Table 3). It confirms our
initial findings: in images reconstructed from a non-private
model, faces were detected (recognised) 63.6% (11%) of
the time, while for our method, detection succeeded only
in 1.3% of cases and recognition rate was 0.3%, well within
state-of-the-art error margins. For DP both rates were at 0%.
To evaluate our privacy estimation method, we look at
how the privacy loss bound µ correlates with the success
of the attack. Figure 3 depicts the privacy-accuracy trade-off
curve for an MLP (64-32-10) trained on artificial data. In this
setting, we use a stacked denoising autoencoder to compress
images to 64-dimensional feature vectors and facilitate the
attack performance. Along the curve, we plot examples of
the model inversion reconstruction at corresponding points.
We see that with growing µ, meaning lower privacy, both
model accuracy and reconstruction quality increase.
Finally, as an additional measure, we perform visual in-
spection of generated examples and corresponding nearest
neighbours in real data. Figures 4 and 5 depict generated
and the corresponding most similar real images from SVHN
and CelebA datasets. We observe that, despite general vi-
sual similarity, generated images differ from real examples
in details, which is normally more important for privacy. For
SVHN, digits vary either in shape, colour or surroundings.
A lot of pairs come from different classes. For CelebA, the
pose and lighting may be similar, but such details as gender,
skin colour, facial features are usually significantly different.
6 Conclusions
We investigate the problem of private data release for com-
plex high-dimensional data. In contrast to commonly stud-
ied model release setting, this approach enables important
advantages and applications, such as data pooling from mul-
tiple sources, simpler development process, and data trading.
We employ generative adversarial networks to produce ar-
tificial privacy-preserving datasets. The choice of GANs as
a generative model ensures scalability and makes the tech-
nique suitable for real-world data with complex structure.
Unlike many prior approaches, our method does not as-
sume access to similar publicly available data. In our experi-
ments, we show that student models trained on artificial data
can achieve high accuracy on MNIST and SVHN datasets.
Moreover, models can also be validated on artificial data.
We propose a novel technique for estimating privacy of
released data by empirical bounds on expected privacy loss.
We compute privacy bounds for samples from WGAN-GP
on MNIST, SVHN, and CelebA, and demonstrate that ex-
pected privacy loss is bounded by single-digit values. To
evaluate provided protection, we run a model inversion at-
tack and show that training with GAN reduces information
leakage (e.g. face detection drops from 63.6% to 1.3%) and
that attack success correlates with estimated privacy bounds.
Additionally, we introduce a simple modification to the
critic: differential privacy layer. Not only does it improve
privacy loss bounds and ensures DP guarantees for the critic
output, but it also acts as a regulariser, improving stability of
training, and quality and diversity of generated images.
Considering the rising importance of privacy research and
the lack of good solutions for private data publishing, there is
a lot of potential future work. In particular, a major direction
of advancing current work would be achieving differential
privacy guarantees for generative models while still preserv-
ing high utility of generated data. A step in another direction
would be to improve the privacy estimation framework, e.g.
by bounding maximum privacy loss, or finding a more prin-
cipled way of sampling from outcome distributions.
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